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Can Lipset’s Theory Travel Through Time And Space?  
The Destination Nicaragua, 1972-1998. 
A Time Series Test of the Social Requisites of Democracy 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens 
live in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population 
could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint 
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues”.1   
-- Juan Lipset 
 
 The epigraph is emblematic of an orthodox theoretical view that ‘only in a wealthy society 
could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in 
politics’ and that this relationship is universal and applicable cross time and space. Comparing 
ancient Greece to modern societies, arguments are made that wealthy societies prerequisite mass 
participating in politics as well as an avoidance of irresponsible demagogues. The development of 
self-restraint through wealth emerges as a universal constant through time and space. However, 
how universalistic is Social Requisites of Democracy cross time and space?  Can we imagine or 
theorize the genesis of the democratic self-restraint in alternative sources? 
 The following research design is an attempt to apply the well-known theory of Lipset’s 
Social Requisites of Democracy to the Central American context, and more specifically, to the 
Nicaraguan case. In recent years,  scholars (such as e.g. Linz and Stepan, Przeworksi, Karl and 
Schmitter) have attempted to apply existing theories to  previously unexamined areas of the world 
(most relevant to this paper is the application of South European and Latin American transitions 
and consolidations to the new democracies of Eastern Europe). But what is their goal? In order to 
gain a new insight of how applicable an existing theory is cross-nationally, Or to show that we 
                                                 
 
1
 Lipset, 1959, p. 75. 
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cannot apply theories to multiple regions?   The latter might indicate that there is specificity and 
uniqueness to a region or a theory. 
 Lipset’s work can be seen asoundational to the modernization theory. Empirics shows at 
most correlation for a strong empirical between economic development and democratic politics. 
Lipset states that wealth constitutes the ultimate cause of democracy, which is brought about by 
changes in society, such as growth of the middle class, industrialization, urbanization and an 
increasing level of education.    
Bearing in mind that Lipset looks at multiple cases, it should be noted that this research 
project emphasizes a single country analysis over time. Another challenge of applying theories to 
different settings is the timing of events. Lipset’s theory was explored in the late 1950’s, and it 
would be very challenging to look to what degree his theory could be applied almost fifty years 
later. This will be the analysis of my paper.  
 The following research will deal explicitly with one of Lipset’s hypotheses that ‘a more 
economic development leads to a more democratic outcome’. Lipset tested his theory cross-
nationally among forty-eight countries, and found a strong relationship between economic 
development and a degree of (“more” versus “less”) democratic outcome. This theory is reflected 
in other relations (can be seen in the realm of the discussion of the relationship between) 
democracy and various conditions, such as religion, economy and behavioral attitudes.  
 More specifically, this research design deals with an application of Lipset’s theory to the 
case of Nicaragua, and can therefore be seen as an attempt to apply an existing theory to a 
longitudinal case study. Potential methodological problems of making inferences should be kept in 
mind, and will be elaborated throughout the paper.   
 This research project will be structured as follows. It will start off with a detailed analysis 
of Lipset’s Social Requisites of Democracy. This includes a careful analysis of which exact 
hypothesis will be tested throughout this paper. Secondly, I will follow with a theoretical 
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discussion on the applicability of Lipset’s theory. In other words, what kind of theoretical 
predictions and conclusions can be drawn from Lipset’s theory, and to what extent can his theory 
be applied to a different theoretical and empirical framework? Thirdly, as this project deals with a 
possible application to the Nicaraguan case, I will ask how well Lipset’s theory can actually travel 
through time and space that is how it fares with respect to one specific country in the Central 
American region. The indicators of wealth, education, urbanization and violence will be tested in 
the Nicaraguan setting. Finally, this paper presents an evaluation of Lipset’s application to the 
Nicaraguan case with the more general questions: What do we learn from transferring existing 
theories into different theoretical and empirical settings? What needs to be taken into account in 
order to accomplish an adequate testing of an existing theory?  
 
PART ONE: LIPSET’S THEORY 
The Theory 
 Lipset’s Social Requisites for Democracy stands as the foundation of modernization 
theory. His overall argument states that there exists a strong empirical relationship between 
economic development and democratic politics. Lipset’s causation stresses social conditions that 
‘serve to support a democratic political system, such as education’.2 
 For Lipset, wealth constitutes the ultimate cause of democracy.  Wealth induces changes 
in the society, such as growth of the middle class, industrialization, and an increasing level of 
education, which make mass participation and democracy possible.  Furthermore, Lipset adds that 
‘the stability of a given democratic system depends not only on the systems’ efficiency in 
modernization, but also upon effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system’.3 Lipset refers to 
                                                 
2
 It is important to stress here that Lipset’s theory looks at the possible emergence of democracy, in 
comparison to Przeworski, who looks at the likelihood of maintaining a democratic country.  
3
 Lipset, 1959, p. 86. 
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Weber who argues that ‘modern democracy in its clearest forms can only occur under the unique 
conditions of capitalist industrialization’.4 
The theory that will be tested throughout the paper is then an increase in wealth, level of 
education and urbanization will bring about a higher level of democratic outcome.5   
The Measurement 
Lipset conducted this comparative research at the aggregate level with an emphasis on the 
socioeconomic characteristics of societies as causal factors of democratization. We find here a 
clear shift from individual to system characteristics. Economic development is measured through 
wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education. Lipset argues that countries that experience a 
higher degree of wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education, are also more democratic 
than countries that experience a lower degree of economic development.6 Lipset researched all 
together forty-eight countries, and divided them into four categories: (1) stable democracies, (2) 
unstable democracies and dictatorships, (3) democracies and unstable dictatorships, and (4) stable 
dictatorships. A further distinction is given that the first and second category is applied to the 
European and English-speaking Nations, and the other two categories are applied to the Latin 
American Nations. Nicaragua was one of the Latin American countries examined by Lipset. 
Because Lipset considered his theory to be applicable to the Nicaraguan context, this paper seeks 
to illustrate the underlying causal mechanisms at play. 
                                                 
4
 Lipset, 1959, p. 73. 
5
 Further work could examine this hypothesis further, by looking at wealth as a predictor of education across 
time.  Is it in fact true that increased wealth corrolates with higher levels of eduction?  A first cut at the 
Nicaraguan case suggests otherwise. 
6
 The economic indicators are measured as follows by Lipset: 
 
Economic Indicator Measurement used by Lipset 
Wealth Per capita income; number per persons per motor vehicle and per physician; number of 
radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons. 
Urbanization Per Cent in Cities over 20,000; Per Cent in Cities over 100,000; Per Cent in Metropolitan 
Areas. 
Education Percentage Literate; (1) Primary, (2) Post-Primary, and (3) Higher Education Enrolled per 
thousand persons. 
Industrialization Percentage of Males in Agriculture; Per Capita Energy consumed. 
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PART TWO: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF LIPSET 
 
Having briefly explored Lipset’s theory, the question now arises of how can we actually 
apply his theory to a different framework? Since Lipset used a cross-national test across forty-
eight countries at time ‘t1’ (1959), the challenge is how we can test his theory adequately 
theoretically and empirically. The test that will be suggested in this paper is not a cross-national 
analysis, but rather a single-case longitudinal study of Nicaragua over twenty-six years7. 
Furthermore, it can also be said that it does not affect the theory, since we can still observe the 
relationship between economic development and level of democracy in a single country over time. 
Furthermore, looking at a single country study over time will provide us with a more accurate 
understanding of the causal linkage between economic development and democracy.8 When 
looking at a single time period, possible unique time factors for that specific year are not taking 
into account.  
A further advantage of looking at a single country over time is that some variables are 
held constant that could have an effect on the level of democracy, such as culture, geography, 
historical background and religion. Since Lipset examined a cross-national country study, he did 
not control for these variables. The purpose of bringing these independent variables into the 
argument is to show possible theoretical weaknesses of Lipset’s theory, as well as possible 
improvements.9 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7
 The time range is from 1972 to 1998. The is no exact theoretical reason of why this data starts exactly in 
1972. However, it is essential that the time range includes different periods of dictatorships/ democracy, 
such as the Somoza period, the Sandinista period, and the developed democracy since 1990. During the 
process of choosing the time line, one essential mark was the equal time distribution for each of this three 
regime types.  
8
 Establishing causation in empirical work is notoriously difficult.  It is especially challanging when time is 
not taken into acount because corrolation might be spurious.  Looking at the independent and dependent 
variables in their natural time sequence, as suggested in this study, is one of the most reliable statistical ways 
of establishing causation. 
9
 The actual empirical testing of the independent variables of culture, ideology and religion will be made at 
a later point in time. The main goal of this research project is solely to test Lipset’s theory. 
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It is significant to note, however, that these variables can have an effect on the level of 
democracy. For example, Huntington argues that religious tradition has been a significant factor in 
transformations to democracy. He states that there ‘has been negative relationship between 
democracy and Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam and Confucianism; conversely 
Protestantism and democracy have been positively interlinked’.10 It is argued here that Protestant 
countries are more likely to give rise to democratic regimes than Catholic ones.11  
Another important variable is culture. As mentioned before, a single-case longitudinal 
study controls for the variable culture. Studies in the past have shown that culture, such as having 
been a former British colony, affects the likelihood of being democratic. It is argued that countries 
that were former British colonies have a greater likelihood of becoming democratic than non-
British colonies. ‘[M]any British colonies, such as those in North America before the revolution or 
India and Nigeria in more recent times, had elections, parties, and the rule of law before they 
became independent’.12 Therefore, democratization was more successful and gradual in the ex-
British colonies. Furthermore, on the variable culture, Huntington argues that cultural factors 
appear more democratic than economic ones.13 Also, according to Almond and Verba, a civic 
culture and a modern personality according to Lerner, have been identified as essential of a 
participant democratic society.14   
 Having analyzed the weaknesses of Lipset’s theory, a good empirical test will guard 
against falling into the same pitfalls. Because this research project tests a single case, it is vital to 
have variation on the dependent variable. Out of Lipset’s categorization of his forty-eight 
countries, we would not take a country into account that never experienced an 
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 Lipset, 1994, p. 5. 
11
 Lipset, 1981, p. 57-58. 
12
 Smith, 1978, p. 13. 
13
 For further reference see: Huntington, 1993, 298-311. 
14
 These alternative independent variables will not be tested throughout this paper. They indicate possible 
alternative explanations, and a possible future research extension.   
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autocracy/dictatorship. Furthermore, it is important that we find a shift towards more democratic 
politics.  
 Here, the Nicaraguan case provides us with an excellent foundation to test Lipset’s theory. 
During the 1970s and 1980s we find less democratic politics than in the 1990s. Furthermore, we 
find a strong variation of wealth (as indicated by Lipset through GDP per capita). As a possible 
weakness of the modernization theory it can be questioned whether there is a systematic 
relationship between economic development and democratic performance, and whether it holds for 
different time points? In a single country analysis I will research whether this relationship holds 
over time. 
‘Ideology’ and ‘Revolution’ 
 Furthermore, other possible variables, such as ‘revolution’ and ‘ideology’ are omitted 
from  Lipset’s analysis. Especially, in the Nicaraguan case, it can be argued that they could have 
had an influential impact on the democratic outcome. In the time period between 1972 and 1998, 
Nicaragua experienced a strong ideological shift from the Somoza regime, a right-wing 
authoritarian one, towards the Sandinista regime, an ideological leftist regime, and closely related 
to Soviet Communism. A question that could be raised here, is to which extend is the type of 
regime/ ideology related to the level of democracy? What do we learn, for example, if we have 
economic growth, but no increase in the democratic outcome? Can we reject the modernization 
hypothesis, or is there something about ideology that shifts the analysis to a different theoretical 
setting?  
 In addition, how would Lipset deal with the variable revolution? 15 He does not include 
revolution/ violence into his analysis. The theoretical discussion states that a violent situation 
makes a country less democratic than a non-violent situation. Through a longitudinal study, in 
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 Lipset conducted his research in 1959. Nicaragua did not experience a revolution in this year. 
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which we find a revolutionary period vis-à-vis non-revolutionary, we would expect to find an 
impact on the democratic politics. 
The Uniqueness of Third-World Countries in the Bi-polar world. 
 Another key point to raise in the Nicaraguan context, is the bi-polar struggle between the 
US and the Soviet Union. Lipset argues that there is some inconsistency in the relationship 
between economic welfare and democracy, and the struggle in the bi-polar world can be seen as 
one of them. However, does the fact that Nicaragua was often a battleground between the two 
superpowers enter into Lipset’s argument? Di Palma argues that ‘the diffusion of democracy to 
some Less Developed Countries in recent years happens largely due to the end of a bi-polar world 
– Third world dictators can no longer take advantage of the tension between the Soviet Union and 
the West’.16  This would have an impact of the democracy on developing country, in this setting to 
Nicaraguan case. 
   
PART THREE: APPLICATION TO THE NICARAGUAN CASE 
 
Before starting off with a narrower specification of why Nicaragua was chosen in this 
context, a more methodological question will be raised:  can we apply a cross-national analysis to 
a single case? We should distinguish here between the processes of theory-building and theory-
testing. In the case of theory-building, applying a single case would be very questionable in terms 
of its generalizability. The fact that we gain a greater insight into a single-case should not be 
underestimated, however, for the process of theory-testing it would not bring us theoretically 
beyond the ‘case border’. However, this particular research project deals with theory-testing. Since 
Lipset includes the single case of Nicaragua in his analysis, it is helpful to ask if his theory holds 
for a single country over time.   
                                                 
16
 Di Palma, 1988, p. 15-21. 
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Nicaragua17 
 Lipset includes the case of Nicaragua in his analysis. Nicaragua, under the Somoza 
regime, was classified in 1959 as a stable dictatorship. Nicaragua is used in this application of 
Lipset’s theory in an attempt to show whether his theory also holds within a single country over 
time. Specifically, Nicaragua is chosen because there we find a strong shift towards democracy 
over the last three decades. It is therefore interesting to ask whether we also find a shift of 
economic development related to the move towards democracy. If we follow Lipset’s argument, 
we find a strong relationship between economic development and degree of democracy. As a 
reminder, Lipset argues that economic development serves as a requisite for democracy. 
Therefore, we would expect that experiencing economic development also increased the 
democratic outcome.  
 
The phenomenon of the economic development under the Somoza regime 
Starting with the time period of 1972, it has to be mentioned here that one of the strongest 
economic growth spurts in Nicaragua occurred under the Somoza regime in which we find 
paradoxically a much lesser degree of democracy than in later time periods. It is argued that 
during the Somoza dynasty the strongest modernization period occurred, in which Nicaragua 
experienced an important and relevant period of development in the nations infrastructure and 
production system. Agriculture and fishing were the main national exports. During this period 
Nicaragua was considered one of the richest and most prominent countries in Central America.18  
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 Nicaragua is considered a third-world nation on the international economic scale. It has today about 5 
million inhabitants, mostly in the age of 1-29 (71%). It has to be mentioned that Nicaragua is still recovering 
from an earthquake 1972, a civil war 1978 – 1979, and a devastating hurricane.    
18
 Exporting $ 566.5 million a year, the economy experienced an economic strength in comparison to the 
other Central American countries. ‘According to Somoza, Nicaragua was “the barn of Central America”. 
With this message he was implying that Nicaraguans had hope in the future. But it was not completely true, 
because he was only enriching the rich, bourgeois and himself. Exploitation was the main instrument of 
production. Laws were made to protect the owners of the land and of the farmers’ (Espinosa, 2001, 12). 
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Starting the measurement in 1972 until 1998, leaves us with the notion that we start off 
already with a very (relative) high level of GDP/ capita. It is therefore hard to argue whether we 
expect to find economic development following 1972.19  
The measurement of how democratic Nicaragua was in a given year will be operationalized 
mainly through the Freedom House Score20. Economic indicators will be measured through 
continuous statistical data of the GDP per capita (Cordobas) starting from 1972 to 1998. 
Furthermore, since Nicaragua experienced an ongoing period of violence, a variable of violence21 
is included in the analysis. Each given year is measured either as ‘violent’ (1) or as ‘non-violent’ 
(2). Included in this category is the Sandinista revolutionary period (1978-79), as well as the 
Contras (1982-88). Furthermore, this test looks at the level of education over time. Illiteracy rate is 
used as a measurement of education, arguing that the combined percentage of urban and rural 
illiteracy reflects the education level of this particular year. Another indicator for whether a 
country is expected to be democratic, is urbanization.    
The model of the test of Lipset’s theory includes the following indicators: 
[ Level of Democracy in Nicaragua  = β(Constant) + b (Econ) + b (Violence) + b (Education) + b (Urbanization) + c  ] 
 
[Graph 2.1.] Here 
As a first overview of the relationship between the Freedom House Score and the wealth indicator 
(GDP/ capita), we find almost no relationship. Observing the results in a very preliminary stage 
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 Furthermore, Nicaragua experienced a very dramatic earthquake in 1972. It had an effect on the national 
economy, the urbanization/ population and education system. It is crucial to mention here that this might 
have a possible impact on the theoretical and methodological accuracy of this analysis.  
20
 The Freedom House Score is measured from ‘1’ to ‘7’. ‘1’ being very democratic, and ‘7’ being very 
undemocratic. The Freedom House Score provides 2 different results: the democratic indicator for civil 
liberty and for political liberty. In this context, the average is used. This research is aware of major 
disadvantages of using Freedom House Score. It can be argued that the Freedom House Score indicates no 
aggregate effect of the level of democracy, or change over time. Another advantage of the Freedom House 
Score is that it is seen as too static. Annual estimates of the ‘openness of a country’ are measured, but 
dynamic changes over time are left out. However, as a democratic indicator, it serves the purpose of this 
research project. Here, democracy is not being seen as a probabilistic value, but rather within a relationship 
of being more vis-à-vis less democratic. In the realm of an extension of this research project, other 
measurements of democracy will be used.  
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(graph 2.1.), we do not find a relationship between GDP/ capita and the Freedom House Score. As 
the GDP increases over time, we actually find an increase of an ‘undemocratic outcome’ (the 
rating for Freedom House increases). However, it has to be mentioned here that in the year of 
1972, Nicaragua experienced a relatively high level of GDP/ capita, and therefore it is very hard to 
expect an increase in the GDP/capita. The following statistical Time-Series Analysis will give us a 
more precise picture of the whole model.    
In order to run an adequate test, a Prais-Winston AR (1) Time-Series regression was run. 
Among the different independent variables, we find a variation in order to obtain an adequate 
measurement.22 The following table shows no significant results for the longitudinal study of 
Nicaragua of twenty-six years for GDP/ capita, violence, and urbanization. However, a statistical 
significant result was found of the level of education, measured through illiteracy rate. The result 
shows that an increase in the GDP/ capita brings about an increase in the rating of Freedom House 
Score, which implies that an increase in literacy rate has a statistically significant effect on a more 
democratic outcome in Nicaragua.   
 
Table 2.1. Prais-Winston AR (1) iterated estimates regression23 
Source         SS           df       MS    Number of obs. =      26 
       F(  4,    21) =   11.76 
Model    10.5094402     4     2.62736005   Prob > F =  0.0000 
Residual   4.69253657  21     .223454122   R-squared =  0.6913 
   Adj R-squared =  0.6325 
Total       15.2019768   25      .608079071   Root MSE =  .47271 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                   
21
 The variable violence is coded as either ‘1’ for violence, and ‘0’ for non-violence. 
22
 The variation is distributed as follows: FH: 2.5 – 6.5; GDP: 4337 – 11039.2; Violence: 0 –1, Education: 
(Illiteracy rate) 42.5 % to 35.7 %; and Urbanization (%): 47 – 63.7.  
23
 Number of obs = 27 
F (3, 23) = 1.51 
Prob > F = 0.2373 
R-squared = 0.1650 
Adj R-squared = 0.0561 
Root MSE = 0.61509 
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FHS        Coef.  Std. Err.      t   P>t      [95% Conf. Interval] 
   
Gdp     -.0000557 .0001545    -0.36    0.722    -.00378  .0002667 
Violence      .4657375 .2943094     1.129   0.129  -.1481811 1.1079656 
Illiteracy     .6469284 .3011929     2.15    0.044  .0186511 1.275206 
Urbaniz     .1314485 .1418462     0.93    0.365 -.1644376 .4273346 
_cons      -28.39357 19.53881   -1.45    0.162 -69.15082 12.36367 
     
rho     .1707489 
     Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.619830 
     Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.866760 
  
The strong relationship between illiteracy and democratic outcome, can best be explained in the 
realm of Lipset  through the following table: 
Lower level of illiteracy ⇒ Higher average level of education ⇒ More potential Newspaper readership  
                            ⇒ More potential school enrollment  
                                 ⇒ Emerging middle class 
                                                                                                    ⇒ Higher Level of Democracy 
 
Lipset argues that literacy brings as an initial possible consequence → democracy, and additional 
consequences of democracy are among others mass society, open class system, and literacy.  
Therefore, it can be argued that we have to be careful about the directional flow of the argument. 
Is it literacy that brings about democracy, or is it democracy that brings about literacy? In the 
Nicaraguan context, it could be argued as well that an increase of the Freedom House Score over 
time leads to an increase of literacy. Looking at the timeline of ‘t1’ versus ‘t2’ might be a possible 
indicator of measuring the directional flow.  
 Having briefly analyzed the statistical significance of the Time Series Analysis, a brief 
remark will be made about the statistical findings for the independent variables of GDP/ capita, 
urbanization, and violence. Although, urbanization and violence do not show statistical 
significance, they still indicate a positive relationship with the Freedom House Score. Especially, 
the independent variable ‘violence’ shows a strong relationship, meaning an increase in violence 
brings about an increase in the Freedom House Score (more despotic). Lipset does not include 
‘violence’ into his analysis.  
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PART THREE: A THEORETICAL EVALUATION 
‘Nicaragua and her culture are part of the shared 
history of Latin America and its relationships with 
successive imperial powers. The terms colonialism,  
      neo-colonialism and dependency are unavoidable 
                                                                                         when dealing with Nicaraguan realities, despite 
their jaded and stereotypical connotations’.24 
 
Having stated that only ‘illiteracy’ indicates statistical significance with the Freedom 
House Score, the question then raises of how do we explain the findings. The following part deals 
with a critical and theoretical evaluation of the statistical findings, as well as possible alternative 
variables that also might cause/ have an impact on the level of democracy in Nicaragua.  
One of the major indicators that if left out by Lipset, is foreign involvement. The variable 
foreign intervention is not yet integrated into this research project and will be researched at a later 
point in time, since the main goal of this research project is to test Lipset’s theory. Especially in 
the Nicaraguan case, we find a strong US presence that might have an impact on the level of 
democracy. It could be argued that the existing US foreign aid under the Somoza regime and the 
drastic foreign aid cut under the Sandinista regime affected the relationship between GDP and 
democratic outcome. If we expect to find a strong relationship between US involvement and an 
increase of democratic outcome, then we also have to look at measurement of the FHS itself. For 
measuring the democratic outcome in Nicaragua between 1972 and 1998, the Freedom House 
Score has been used. However, it can be assumed that we find an anti-communist bias within the 
Freedom House measurement. On the continuum between (1) democratic and (7) undemocratic, 
the communist period under Sandinistas was rated more despotic than the period under the 
Somoza regime. Therefore, it can be argued that any US involvement would increase the 
democratic outcome, because it would shift away from a communist regime.  
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 Quintanilla. 
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Explaining the democratic outcome through education and its implication 
The table shows a strong relationship between education and democratic outcome. In the realm of 
Nicaragua’s 21st century, it experiences many important changes, such as ‘the incorporation of the 
army to civil life, high rates of unemployment, health epidemics, and starvation’.25 Education can 
be seen within this negative situation. We find a very high rate of illiteracy, which is a reflection 
of Nicaragua’s poverty and level of education. Having in mind that seventy-one percent of the 
population is under thirty years old, education would be the best starting point for gaining a more 
democratic outcome.  
 As Lipset, Lerner also finds urbanization and education as essential factors for the process 
of democratic development. However, he includes another variable of media growth 
(communication) in the model that is unconsidered by Lipset. Lerner considers urbanization ‘to be 
a stimulating factor, which in turn accelerates media growth and eventually democratic 
development’.26 It could be argued here that looking at media growth in Nicaragua could be an 
indicator of democracy. However, as measured within this analysis, urbanization does not show 
statistical significance with the democratic outcome. A possible extension would be here to 
measure the actual media growth (number of communication devises, such as radio, TV and 
telephone) in Nicaragua over time, in order to test Lerner’s theory. The media growth shows a 
possible alternative way of how we can measure urbanization in a more media oriented way, and 
from here it would be interesting to see whether it has an impact on the level of democracy.  
Another possible theoretical explanation of why Nicaragua does not follow Lipset’s 
theory that an increase in wealth (GDP/ capita) brings about an increase in democratic outcome, is 
Arat’s explanation. According to Arat, who revisited the modernization theory, Nicaragua falls 
into the category of curvilinear (polynomial) positive-negative relationship. It covers the countries 
‘which display an increase  in the level  of democracy with increasing levels of economic 
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 Espinosa, 2001, p. 1. 
 15 
development until a certain level of economic development is reached and no relationship after 
that economic development level’.27 In the Nicaraguan context, it can be argued here that since at 
the starting point of this analysis, in 1972, Nicaragua experienced a very high GDP/ capita, and 
therefore it reached his ‘certain’ level of economic development. According to Arat, a theoretical 
explanation could be drawn that since the level of economic development is been reached in the 
early 1970’s in Nicaragua, we do not find an increase in economic development, and therefore no 
relationship between an increase of the GDP/ capita and an increase in democratic outcome. 
Furthermore Arat argues that only a few countries fit the model suggested by the modernization 
theory.28 
 
Conclusion:  
Having presented a few alternative explanations, the last part deals with a possible further 
research extension. The future research goal involves two main aspects, first a more in-depth 
analysis of the role of education in Nicaragua’s explanation for democratic outcome. The second 
one is an expanding of the country analysis in Central America. It can be seen as an attempt to 
solve the possible problem of small N data, and a possible uniqueness of the Nicaraguan case. The 
more in-depth analysis of the role of education can be seen as a crucial factor for gaining a more 
democratic outcome. As mentioned during my statistical analysis, education (measured through 
Illiteracy rate) has a high relationship with democratic outcome. Here, an interesting research 
extension would be: How the improvement of the level of education would result in a more 
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 Arat, 1988, p. 22. 
27
 Arat, 1988, p. 28. If we were to include the evolutionary thesis, ‘most of “developing countries” should 
appear in the positive-linear category, and most of the “developed” countries should appear in the No-
relationship category.  
28
 ‘Out of 120 countries only eight experience increasing level of democracy with increasing levels of 
economic development, and the developed with the rest of the developing countries are spread in the other 
categories, each of which suggests a different pattern of relationship. 
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democratic outcome. Certain strategies, such as the role of the state, as well as obstacles29 would 
be researched.     
It is always a challenge to apply an existing theory to different regions and different time 
periods than was originally intended. This paper applied Lipset’s theory to the Central American 
region of Nicaragua over a time span of twenty-six years. Whether this application was successful 
can only partially be answered through a purely statistical measurement. In the realm of statistical 
significance, it can be said that education shows a very strong relationship to democratic outcome.  
In the purely Nicaraguan setting between 1972 and 1998, we found that wealth, as Lipset 
presented, to be the main predicator of democratic outcome, to have no relationship in the 
Nicaraguan context.  
 Coming back to the initial question, whether Lipset’s theory travels through time and 
space, it can be answered that in the setting of the Nicaraguan, we find only a very limited 
application of Lipset’s theory. Although no single case can prove or disprove a theory, the 
Nicaraguan case is at least very suggestive that economic growth is not a universal constant in 
democratic politics. 
 
                                                 
29
 According to the Minister of Education, Fernando Robleto, the following are some of the major obstacles 
that hindered the process of increasing the level of education: 1. Insufficient training of the main partakers 
involved in the process, 2. A weakened control system. 3. Insufficient communication and diffusion of the 
process by means of a massive information campaign, 4. A precise model of school autonomy was neither 
well established nor well documented. (Espinosa, 2001, p. 24).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. “Year, GDP/ capita, Freedom House Score, Violence, Illiteracy Rate and 
Urbanization for Nicaragua” 
 
Year 
GDP/ 
capita30 
FHS31
  
Violence
32
 
Illiteracy 
rate33 
US 
involve
ment 
Urban34 
(%) 
1972 9363 3.5 0 42.5 1 47 
1973 9645.3 4.5 0 42.4 1 47 
1974 10662.2 4.5 0 42.3 1 47 
1975 10305.6 4.5 0 42.2 1 50.3 
1976 10509.5 5 0 42.1 1 50.3 
1977 11039.2 5 0 42 1 50.3 
1978 9861.4 5 1 41.9 1 50.3 
1979 7027.5 5 1 41.8 1 50.3 
1980 7125.8 5 0 41.5 1 53.4 
1981 7282.1 5.5 0 41.2 1 53.4 
1982 7005.4 5.5 1 40.9 1 53.4 
1983 7108.1 5.5 1 40.6 1 53.4 
1984 6786.3 5 1 40.3 1 55.8 
1985 6313.5 5 1 40.2 1 56.4 
1986 6104.3 5.5 1 39.8 1 57 
1987 5920.6 5 1 39.4 1 57.6 
                                                 
30
 Central Bank of Nicaragua. Economic Studies Department. GDP per capita (millions of 1980 Cordobas). 
31
 Freedom House Score: from the Freedom House Indicator. Rating (7) as very undemocratic and (1) very 
democratic. The values are the mean of civil and political liberties. 
32
 The Violence variable is coded as a dummy variable: meaning (1) violence, and (2) non-violence. The 
Year between of 1978 and 1979 are coded as violent, in which the Nicaraguan Revolution occurred. 
Furthermore, the years of 1982 until 1988 are also coded as violent, in which the Contras  occurred. The 
dates were taken from the BBC News Time Line from March 11, 2003, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1225283.stm ). 
33
 Illiteracy Rate is being used as an predictor of education. The measured shows the percentage of the total 
population of combined urban and rural areas. (Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 38, p.252). 
34
 Percentage of Urban Population: from World Development Indicators, World Bank 2002. The World 
Indicator did not provided information for the following years: 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981 
and 1982. In the cases of 1973 and 1974, the information were taken from the year 1972. In the cases 1977, 
1978 and 1979, the information were taken from the year 1975. In the cases 1981 and 1982, the information 
were taken from the year 1980. Since we do not expect to find a drastic change of percentage of the urban 
population from one year to the next, it might be argued that it is adequate to use for example in 1973, data 
from 1972. However, a major endogenous factor that has an influence on the percentage of urban population 
in Nicaragua are Hurricanes due to the high amount of number of death. Nicaragua experienced two major 
Hurricanes, the ‘Great Hurricane’ in 1780 (killed 22.000 people) and ‘Hurricane Mitch’ in 1998.                                     
Hurricane Mitch was the worst natural disaster in Nicaragua's history. An estimated 3,000 people died or are 
still missing. 870,000 people - 18% of the total population - were affected by the storm. According to 
USAID, the Nicaraguan government estimated that nationwide more than 30,000 houses had been either 
totally or partially destroyed and as many as 870,000 people were estimated to have been displaced.                           
(USAID report on Nicaragua) Therefore, it can be argued that the Hurricane has an effect on the percentage 
of Urban population, but not on the years, of missing data. 
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1988 5063.3 4.5 1 39.1 1 58.2 
1989 4859.9 5 0 38.6 1 58.8 
1990 4744.7 3 0 38.7 1 59.4 
1991 4599 3 0 38.4 0 59.9 
1992 4483.5 3.5 0 38.1 0 60.5 
1993 4337 4.5 0 37.8 0 61 
1994 4352.5 4.5 0 37.5 0 61.6 
1995 4409.2 4 0 37.2 0 62.1 
1996 4495.7 3 0 36.7 0 62.6 
1997 4598.4 3 0 36.2 0 63.1 
1998 4656.9 2.5 0 35.7 0 63.7 
 
Table A.3. “Prais-Winsten AR (1) Regression of Freedom House Score and GDP” 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS                 Number of Obs =      28 
---------------------------------------------------   F(  1,    26) =    4.30 
       Model |  1.47323825     1  1.47323825             Prob > F      =  0.0482 
    Residual |  8.90808916    26  .342618814             R-squared     =  0.1419 
---------------------------------------------------             Adj R-squared =  0.1089 
       Total |  10.3813274    27  .384493608             Root MSE      =  .58534 
 
 
 
           
          c3 |        Coef.         Std. Err.        T         P>|t|        [95%       Conf. Interval] 
          c2 |     .0001158     .0001309     0.88    0.385    -.0001532    .0003848 
       cons |   3.390585     .9742765     3.48      0.002     1.387931    5.393239 
         rho |     .7523027 
 
   Durbin-Watson statistic (original)     0.522217 
   Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.897826 
 
Graph 2.1. “Scatterplotts of FHS/ GDP”35 
Nicaragua 1972 - 1999
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35
 The distribution is a result from table A1. 
